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Political Membership in the Contractarian
Defense of Cosmopolitanism
Lea Ypi
Abstract: This article assesses the recent use of contractarian strategies for the
justiﬁcation of cosmopolitan distributive principles. It deals in particular with the
cosmopolitan critique of political membership and tries to reject the claim that
political communities are arbitrary for the scope of global justice. By focusing on the
circumstances of justice, the nature of the parties, the veil of ignorance, and the
sense of justice, the article tries to show that the cosmopolitan critique of political
membership modiﬁes the contractarian premises in a way that is both unwarranted
and unnecessary. While failing to establish principles of global distributive justice,
existing cosmopolitan adaptations of the social contract device simply weaken the
method’s justiﬁcatory potential.
Preliminary Remarks
Effective political theory marries “why” and “how,” desirability and feasi-
bility.1 To provide normative guidance to institutional reform, it must fulﬁl
the following two requirements. First, it must identify the principles accord-
ing to which institutions ought to distribute the beneﬁts and burdens of social
interaction. Call this the justiﬁcatory task. Second, it must analyze incentives:
the reasons particular agents support political arrangements applying those
principles to practice. Call this the motivational task.
The present article assesses one recent attempt to cope with both require-
ments in connection with global institutional reform: the cosmopolitan-
contractarian defense of distributive justice.2 It illustrates its ﬂaws in
Earlier versions of this article were presented at the University of Essex Political
Theory Conference and at the conference on “The Social and the Political” at the
European University Institute. I am grateful to participants at these events, as well
as to Renato Caputo, Bob Goodin, Katrin Flikschuh, Peter Wagner, Jonathan White,
the editors and referees of The Review of Politics for their excellent comments and sug-
gestions.
1See Robert Goodin and Philip Pettit, eds. A Companion to Contemporary Political
Philosophy (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 1–6.
2Some relevant contractarian defenses of global justice, upon which I focus more
speciﬁcally in the following pages, may be found in Charles Beitz, Political Theory
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undertaking the justiﬁcatory and motivational task described above, and it
ascribes such ﬂaws to that project’s disregard of the normative relevance of
particular political communities. It advances an alternative view of the
polity’s role which, far from weakening the cosmopolitan-contractarian case
in favor of global justice, lends support to it.
The article’s critique of existent cosmopolitan-contractarian accounts of
global justice particularly targets two features of that theory: (1) its commit-
ment to a noncomparative ideal of equality3 and (2) its insistence that mem-
bership in particular political communities is arbitrary for the scope of global
justice. That equality is “noncomparative” means that it is possible to deter-
mine globally what kind of valid claims for the distribution of primary
goods individuals may have, without reference to particular schemes of
cooperation or to one’s membership in a political association. That political
communities are “arbitrary” means that they play no relevant role in the nor-
mative analysis of global distributive principles and that they would have no
special status if the current global order were reformed following speciﬁc
principles of justice. Brieﬂy put, cosmopolitan contractarianism claims that
it is possible to abstract from membership in particular political communities
from both a justiﬁcatory perspective (determining what kind of distributive
shares parties are rightly entitled to in the world at large) and from a motiva-
tional one (focusing on the way in which the justiﬁed distribution of resource
allocation is endorsed by particular agents and further institutionalized). This
essay tries to illustrate where cosmopolitan contractarianism goes wrong
and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 127–83 and
198–216; Charles Beitz, “Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiments,” Journal of
Philosophy 80, no. 10 (1983): 591–600; Brian Barry, The Liberal Theory of Justice
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 128–32; Darrel Moellendorf, Cosmopolitan Justice
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002), 6–67; Thomas Pogge, Realizing Rawls (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1989), 211–80 and Thomas Pogge, “An Egalitarian Law of
Peoples,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 23, no. 3 (1994): 155–224; David A.J. Richards,
“International Distributive Justice,” in Ethics, Economics, and the Law, Nomos XXIV,
ed. J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (New York: New York University
Press, 1982), 275–99. Despite his emphasis on some limits of the argument, Simon
Caney is also broadly sympathetic to this approach in his Justice Beyond Borders—A
Global Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 107–115. Some of the
claims to which I refer in the following pages, in particular those regarding the distri-
bution of natural resources, are endorsed by Tim Hayward, “Global Justice and the
Distribution of Natural Resources,” Political Studies 54, no. 2 (2006): 349–69 and by
Brian Barry, “Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective,” in Ethics, Economics and
the Law, Nomos XXIV, ed. J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman (New York:
New York University Press, 1982), 219–52.
3For a ﬁrst reference to the distinction between comparative and noncomparative
ideas of justice, see Joel Feinberg, “Noncomparative Justice,” Philosophical Review 83,
no. 3 (1974): 297–338. My use of the term here is related but not identical to Feinberg’s.
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with regard to both issues and to explain why. It also emphasizes that it is
unnecessary to criticize political communities within a cosmopolitan recon-
struction of the contractarian strategy. A strong case in favor of cosmopolitan-
contractarian justice could be made even if one conceded the normative
relevance of political membership.
To emphasize what this article does not aim to do is also important. It does
not try to extend its critique to other defenses of cosmopolitan justice, such as
duty-based, rights-based, or consequentialist, to mention but the most promi-
nent ones.4 It also does not attempt to restate familiar communitarian or par-
ticularist objections to contractarianism as such, nor does it emphasize the
non-arbitrary standing of political communities in order to undermine the
validity of global principles of distributive justice. Its main claim is more
restricted, more constructive—and has not been made in the present form.
I do not deny the general possibility of using the social contract device to
justify global distributive principles; I only argue against present contractar-
ian accounts that consider political communities arbitrary for that purpose.5
4For a duty-based approach, see Onora O’Neill, Bounds of Justice (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2000), and “Agents of Justice,” Metaphilosophy 32, no. 1
(2001): 180–95. The most prominent consequentialist views can be found in Robert
E. Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable: A Reanalysis of Our Social Responsibilities
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1985) and “What Is So Special About Our
Fellow Country-Men?,” Ethics, 98, no. 4 (1988): 666–83 and Martha Nussbaum,
Frontiers of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006). For the
rights-based perspective, see Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Afﬂuence, and
U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1996) and Charles Jones,
Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
Although starting with a contractarian strategy of justiﬁcation in Realizing Rawls,
Pogge’s book World Poverty and Human Rights also defends global justice from a
rights-based perspective. See Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002). Pogge’s apparently shifting position is due to the
attempt to develop what he calls an “ecumenical” case in favor of global justice,
which appeals to defenders of different strategies of justiﬁcation. See the clariﬁcation
in Thomas Pogge, “Real World Justice,” The Journal of Ethics 9, (2005): 25–53; 36–37. In
this article I am only concerned with Pogge’s contractarian arguments.
5This is also the main difference between my defense of political membership and
that of Rawls in The Law of Peoples. Indeed, the original position advocated by
Rawls in this latter work starts with representatives of states (or peoples) but rejects
the possibility of justifying global distributive principles. See John Rawls, The Law of
Peoples (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 118–21. I take Rawls to
be right in stressing the relevance of political membership in the global application
of the contractarian method but wrong in using this argument to deny the plausibility
of global distributive principles. Since I only focus on cosmopolitan applications of con-
tractarianism, I cannot go into the details of Rawls’s global theory of justice in this paper.
Instead I shall discuss some key features of his domestic theory of justice as they are
endorsed by various cosmopolitan contractarians and emphasize some of the ﬂaws
deriving from this endorsement when combined to the cosmopolitan claim for the
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What I try to show, therefore, is (1) that contractarian-cosmopolitan critiques
of the normative status of political communities are ﬂawed and (2) that such
critiques modify the contractarian premises so as to weaken unnecessarily
that method’s own potential of justiﬁcation.
In order to illustrate these points I examine a number of contractarian
assumptions regarding both the choice situation and the background con-
ditions required to develop cosmopolitan principles of justice. More particu-
larly I focus on some features of the contractarian original position with
regards to (1) the circumstances of justice; (2) the nature of the parties;
and (3) the use and function of the veil of ignorance. In the following
three sections, I endorse the cosmopolitan version of the original position
and try to illustrate some of its ﬂaws in facing the justiﬁcatory and motiva-
tional task discussed above. The principal cause of these ﬂaws is the require-
ment to abstract from political membership in analyzing the objective
circumstances of justice and the subjective constraints of the parties.
Exposing some internal inconsistencies of this particular way of applying
the contractarian model will serve to refute the argument that political
communities are arbitrary for the scope of justice and to illustrate some
weaknesses in present cosmopolitan-contractarian defenses of global
distributive principles.
The Circumstances of Justice
Rather than a historical hypothesis on how human beings have come to agree
throughout time on speciﬁc norms of justice, the ﬁction of a “social contract”
represents in contemporary political theory a methodological device for
investigating on the principles according to which the beneﬁts and burdens
of social cooperation ought to be distributed. Most famously associated to
Rawls’s A Theory of Justice, the method has recently been deployed by
various cosmopolitan scholars trying to extend the ﬁndings of Rawls’s dom-
estic theory of justice to global political institutions.6 The idea of an original
arbitrariness of political communities. For a more detailed discussion of Rawls’s global
theory of justice, see my “On the Confusion between Ideal and Non-Ideal in Recent
Debates on Global Justice,” paper presented at the European Consortium for Political
Research, 35th Joint Session of Workshops, Helsinki, May 7–12, 2007, accessible at http://
www.essex.ac.uk/ecpr/events/jointsessions/paperarchive/helsinki/ws17/Ypi.pdf.
6Because of its inﬂuence on the cosmopolitan version of the social contract, this
article focuses on the adaptation of Rawls’s domestic contractarianism to the circum-
stances of international society. It does not either consider other versions of it such as
David Gauthier’s account or attempt to redress Rawls’s premises where they do not
seem quite compatible with classical contractarian theories such as Rousseau’s or
Kant’s. What it tries to do instead is to point at the tensions that the attempt to
apply Rawls’s domestic theory of justice at the international level generates when
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position in which reasonable contractors discuss a number of competing con-
ceptions of justice and determine by overlapping consent the principles that
should regulate public social interactions is thus extended to the basic insti-
tutions of the world society and deployed to justify global distributive
principles.7
One of the fundamental premises of contractarian theories is to treat the
principles of justice as necessitated by a speciﬁc choice situation. This situ-
ation is characterized by “circumstances of justice” understood as back-
ground conditions that give rise to the necessity of coordinating the claims
of conﬂicting parties with regard to the distribution of certain primary
goods. The domestic theory of justice that contractarian cosmopolitans take
as a starting point speciﬁes these conditions by endorsing Humean circum-
stances of justice whereby certain subjective and objective factors make
human cooperation both possible and necessary.8 So, for example, sharing
the same geographical territory, scarcity of resources, and human vulner-
ability to attack, are objective circumstances. The presence of scarcity
means that resources are not so abundant as to make human cooperation
superﬂuous, yet scarcity is moderate in that it does not destroy all possibilities
for a common venture. On the other hand, subjective circumstances refer to
the motivational background of parties considered roughly equal in mental
and physical powers: there is a complementarity of needs and interests that
makes possible assessing a cooperative venture, and there is a diversity of
life plans that gives rise to conﬂicting claims on the best scheme of distri-
bution. Furthermore, the parties consider their conceptions of the good as
worthy of recognition but suffer from several limits, moral and natural, to
the full exercise of their human capacities such as knowledge, thought, and
judgement.9
It is important to examine the global circumstances of justice upon which
the cosmopolitan original position relies and to assess the role that the
abstraction from particular political communities plays at this point of the
combined with existing cosmopolitan arguments for the arbitrariness of political
communities.
7See Pogge, Realizing Rawls, 254; Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, 129;
Caney, Justice Beyond Borders, 107; Moellendorf, Cosmopolitan Justice, 7; Richards,
“International Distributive Justice,” 278–82.
8Rawls’s domestic argument featured in Beitz, Political Theory and International
Relations, 130–31, and in his “Justice and International Relations,” Philosophy and
Public Affairs 4, no. 4 (1975): 366–67; as well as in Pogge, Realizing Rawls, 242–54.
The relevance of being in circumstances where resources are scarce and individuals
have an interest to frame principles of justice jointly is emphasized also by
Moellendorf, Cosmopolitan justice, 20–23.
9John Rawls, ATheory of Justice, rev. ed (Cambridge, MA.: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1999), 110; Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, 130–31.
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argument. Let us consider ﬁrst the objective circumstances and start with the
requirement that parties interact in a deﬁned geographical territory under
conditions of vulnerability and moderate scarcity. Several cosmopolitan scho-
lars have suggested that we understand as territory the whole world and
emphasize that the global original position abstract from political member-
ship.10 In circumstances of justice such as these, cooperation under conditions
of scarcity would be affected by two main factors: ﬁrst, the human and social
efforts contributing to economic development and inﬂuencing the parties’
different endowments of primary goods, and second, the “natural” com-
ponent of human cooperation, those material resources or “utilities derived
from any portion of the earth” due to would-be arbitrary factors such as
the parties’ geographical location.11
It is precisely on this second element that the cosmopolitan original position
relies in order to justify the need for a global principle distributing natural
resources. Cosmopolitans argue that since political communities simply
happen to ﬁnd themselves in resource-poor or resource-rich regions of the
earth, political membership is irrelevant in determining to what individuals
are entitled in global circumstances of justice. Charles Beitz has considered
this claim analogous to Rawls’s account of natural talents in the domestic
version of the contract and claimed that “citizens of a nation which ﬁnds
itself on top of a gold mine do not gain a right to the wealth that might be
derived from it.”12 Resources must be present in nature before they are
10See, for example, Barry, The Liberal Theory of Justice, 128–32; Beitz, Political Theory
and International Relations, 129–36, 143–53; Moellendorf, Cosmopolitan Justice, 30–40;
Pogge, Realizing Rawls, 247 ff. For a similar critique of Rawls’s limitation of the original
position to domestic societies see also Thomas M. Scanlon, “Rawls’ Theory of Justice”
in Reading Rawls: Critical Studies on Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, ed. Norman Daniels
(New York: Basic Books, 1975), 202–3.
11The expression is taken by Sidgwick and appears in Beitz’s characterization of the
circumstances of justice in Political Theory and International Relations, 136–43. See also
Beitz, “Justice and International Relations,” 366–67. It must be noticed that Beitz pre-
sents two versions of the contractarian argument and that in one of them, while dis-
cussing the issue of natural resources, he concedes that the addressees of
distributive claims may be representatives of states. This, however, complicates
rather than makes more straightforward his position. Indeed, the answer to the
general question we are interested in—whether political communities are arbitrary
for determining individual entitlements to natural resources and Beitz’s claim that
they are—remains unchanged in both versions. On the difﬁculty for states to accept
a resource distribution principle on the basis of this latter assumption, see
Hayward, “Global Justice and the Distribution of Natural Resources,” 352–53 other-
wise sympathetic to some of Beitz’s claims and David Miller’s critical remarks in
“Justice and Global Inequality” in Inequality, Globalization, and World Politics, ed.
Andrew Hurrel and Ngaire Woods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 191–98.
12See Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, 141. Compare the almost iden-
tical statement in Beitz, “Justice and International Relations,” 368–69.
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appropriated, and “no one has a natural prima facie claim to the resources that
happen to be under his feet.”13 Thomas Pogge also emphasizes how “the
natural assets in a state’s territory are not a reﬂection of the moral worth of—
are not deserved by—either this state or its citizens.”14 Brian Barry goes on
to make a similar claim when he argues that “the economic prospects of a
country depend on something for which its inhabitants (present and past)
can take absolutely no credit and lay no just claim to its exclusive beneﬁts,
namely its natural resources—including in this land, water, minerals and so
on.”15 Since the members of particular political communities have done
nothing to deserve the natural resources lying under their soil, the parties in
global circumstances of justice are entitled to an equal portion of the earth’s
natural resources, regardless of their political membership.
This argument is problematic.16 In the following pages, I try to show how it
is both difﬁcult to argue that political communities are arbitrary for the distri-
bution of natural resources and also unnecessary to a contractarian-type of
case in favor of cosmopolitan justice. From the point of view of the former,
I will try to clarify what it means for resources to be available in nature
and what role political communities might play in the claims of individuals
to an equal share of them. From the point of view of the latter, I shall argue
that focusing on the arbitrariness of political communities for the distribution
of natural resources unnecessarily weakens the use of contractarian strategies
to justify cosmopolitan distributive principles.
Where the Arbitrariness-Argument Goes Wrong
Let us start with the ﬁrst objection. Let us suppose that particular citizens of
particular countries have done nothing to deserve the wealth that could be
derived from the gold mine lying under their feet. Now the example of the
gold mine that Beitz provides to illustrate what one ﬁnds in nature is
already problematic since it is obvious that mines are not usually “found”
13Ibid.
14See Pogge, Realizing Rawls, 225-250.A similar desert-based argument has led Pogge
to justify a global resource dividend. See his “An Egalitarian Law of Peoples,” 155–224.
15See Barry, “Humanity and Justice in Global Perspective,” 219–52.
16The argument has been articulated at greater length by Charles Beitz. However,
my remarks apply not only to Beitz but also to the other authors mentioned above,
as well as to those scholars who have endorsed Beitz’s claims on natural resources
without questioning their coherence and indeed necessity from a contractarian per-
spective. See, for example, Hayward, “Global Justice and the Distribution of Natural
Resources,” 349–69 and Caney, Justice Beyond Borders, 107–15. Although Caney
does recognize some limitations of the cosmopolitan contractarian argument in deli-
vering a complete theory of global distributive justice, he fails to see the role played
by the critique of political membership in determining those limitations and is other-
wise sympathetic to Beitz’s argument on natural resources.
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but constructed, in which case it may not be entirely arbitrary that those who
constructed the mine are also entitled to its product. I will not comment more
on this point but simply assume that Beitz has wrongly used the word “mine”
where he perhaps intended to refer to gold “reserves.” The difﬁculty even
with this latter assumption is that it is not the arbitrary fact of being out
there, ready for use, that makes gold reserves amenable to the production
of wealth. Gold reserves would not produce any wealth unless those poten-
tially proﬁting from this wealth knew that it would be possible for it to do
so. Whether given resources are needed and for what purpose does not
depend on their availability in nature but on the social meaning they
acquire and the use that is made of them. So while it may be true that the
simple location of natural resources is arbitrary from a moral point of view,
this arbitrariness is also irrelevant. What matters here is not determining
whether individuals are justly entitled to an equal share of resources that
could produce wealth but whether they are justly entitled to those that do.
And in order to answer this latter question, one has to establish whether
the signiﬁcance for use and potential value of such resources are everywhere
the same regardless of community membership.
In order to understand that they are not, and that community membership
constitutionally affects the social meaning of natural objects, consider the fol-
lowing anecdote that Marx tells when explaining the fetish character of
commodities:
No divinity was so deadly to the savages as gold, which they believed cer-
tainly to be the Fetish of the Spaniards, judging the type of the Spaniards
belief according to their own and according to the profound veneration
they saw in the Spaniards for this metal. The barbarians of Cuba,
knowing that a ﬂotilla from Castille was going to descend on their land,
judged that they had better conciliate ﬁrst to the God of the Spaniards,
and then distance it from themselves. They gathered all their gold in a
basket. Behold they said the God of these foreigners; let us celebrate a fes-
tival in its honour in order to obtain its protection; in this way we will
make it depart from our island. They danced and sang according to the
way of their religion around the basket, then threw it in the sea.17
The Cubans are thus unaware of the value of gold; they have simply observed
that the Spanish adore it and have assumed that it must therefore constitute
their god. It is not a natural resource they lack—the Cubans dispose of plenty
of gold, but they ignore the use that could be made of it. If their
17The note is found in an unpublished manuscript in the Institut fu¨r Sozialgeschiche
in Amsterdam. Marx seems to have taken the anecdote from the book Du Culte des
Dieux Fe´tiches ou Paralle`le de l’Ancienne Religion de l’Egypte avec la Religion Actuelle de
Nigritie, 1760 by the French writer Charles de Brosses. My quotation is taken from
Kevin MacLaughlin, Writing in Parts: Imitation and Exchange in Nineteenth-Century
Literature (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 13–14.
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understanding and that of the Spanish naturally converged, they would have
perhaps hidden the gold, exchanged it for other beneﬁts, or traded it to their
own advantage. Instead, interpreting the behavior of the Spanish according to
their speciﬁc cultural categories, they think it more appropriate to dance and
sing around gold, throw it into the sea, and hope that this will sufﬁce to expel
the Spanish.
It seems clear that the kind of society to which both the Cubans and the
Spanish belong is not indifferent to the way gold is valued and the use that
is consequently made of it. The difﬁculty with accepting the cosmopolitan
claim on the arbitrariness of political communities resides in its assumption
that the value given and, consequently, the use made of primary resources
do not depend on their social meaning and on collective efforts to render
them valuable. This argument, as one can see, wrongly focuses on individual
entitlements in natural circumstances but underestimates the role of collective
social and political factors.
Here two possible objections might arise.18 The ﬁrst one is that even though
one might agree that community membership plays a relevant role in shaping
the social meaning of natural objects, it is not clear why the boundaries of
such a signiﬁcance-conferring community ought to be speciﬁcally domestic
political boundaries. The example above, one might argue, obscures the
fact that the interest of Spain for gold was common to all European states
at the time, thus inviting us to consider that the boundaries of the
signiﬁcance-conferring community might be wider than those of particular
states.
Before we attempt to respond to this objection and clarify how speciﬁcally
domestic political factors might have an important role to play in the valori-
sation of natural resources, let me emphasize that such an objection does not
contribute to strengthening the individualist cosmopolitan case in favor of the
arbitrariness of political communities. It does not, in other words, show that it
is possible to determine what natural resources individuals are entitled to if
we completely abstract from community membership. Indeed the objection
above grants that community membership matters but asks us to show
why it is that domestic, political boundaries are more relevant than additional
social or cultural ones. Notice, however, that in so doing such an objection
implicitly undermines the cosmopolitan case for an individualist distribution
of natural resources with which we started. The objection, that is, does not
prove the correctness of the cosmopolitan arbitrariness argument; it does
not show that it is possible to determine what individuals are entitled to if
they are considered as such. It simply tries to extend the relevance of political
communities to take into account additional collective features and requires
18I am grateful to the anonymous reviewers of this journal for inviting me to con-
sider them.
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clarifying the speciﬁc role of state institutions in determining different ways
of relating to natural resources.
By focusing precisely on the case of Spain in the sixteenth century, I try to
show below that even in the presence of a general awareness on the relevance
of natural resources (such as that shared by European elites at that time) dom-
estic institutions mattered tremendously for understanding the performance
of, for instance, Spain, France, and Holland with regard to the optimization of
natural resources. Before I go into the details of such claims, let me emphasize
what an objector would have to show in order both to prove the arbitrariness
of political communities and to strengthen the case for an individualist
approach to natural resource distribution. In order to succeed with both
tasks, a critic would need to argue for a global overlap in individual judg-
ments with regard to which natural resources ought to be considered valu-
able. This is precisely what the second objection attempts to show.
The second objection emphasizes that even though social meaning might
have mattered in the past in relation to conventionally precious metals, this
does not seem to be the case under current global circumstances of injustice
where all actors involved seem to know what counts as relevant and scarce
resources. Gold may not have been valuable for Cubans a few centuries
ago, just as oil may not have been considered valuable by the citizens of
Kuwait when it was ﬁrst discovered. But when everyone is exposed to the
pressure of the same international markets, as in current global economic
practices, it seems hard to concede that people will fail to converge on their
judgment of what natural resources produce wealth.
This objection targets only the idea that it seems difﬁcult in a globalized
world to abstract from community membership, as far as epistemic consider-
ations determining which natural resources are likely to produce wealth are
concerned. It does nothing to discredit the thought that those who have tried
to transform potential wealth into actual wealth are entitled to the beneﬁts of
their work or should be held responsible for its loss. Products are not “found”
in the state of nature, and individuals do not enrich themselves by bumping
into inherently valuable natural resources. Instead, even natural resources
must be analyzed, extracted, exchanged, traded, and so forth. Human
labor, scientiﬁc and technologic expertise, background infrastructures, and
societal, cultural, and political circumstances are essential to the production
of wealth. But how do wemove from here to the fact that political boundaries
and domestic political factors have a relevant role to play in this process?
Re-examining the case of Spain and its incredible rise and fall between the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries might help us illuminate the issue at
stake here. Early sixteenth-century Spain was one of the largest political hege-
monies in Europe, inﬂuenced by Erasmian thought and in close contact with
the rest of the Continent’s cultural centers. Ambitious monarchs, such as
Ferdinand and Isabella of Castile, approved the Navigation Acts, invested
resources in maritime enterprises, and together with Charles V played a
major role in determining the success of colonial enterprises. All the treasure
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entering Europe during the sixteenth century passed through the ports of
Spain. No other state had access to the American mines, and the Spanish
were the ﬁrst to perfect amalgamation processes for extracting precious
metals such as silver and gold.19
Within only one century—roughly after 1598—large parts of the Spanish
population were on the verge of famine, maritime investments had practically
ceased, and following several naval defeats, the Spanish ﬂag is said to have
disappeared from the seas.20 Historians claim that the cause of this failure
of the Spanish culture was “hidalguia,” the dissolute habits of the aristocracy,
their avid expenditures on castles and jewelry instead of investing in techno-
logical advancements, and the absence of an administrative reform for tax col-
lection. In addition to these factors, the persecution of Jews and Moors led to
the migration of some of the most industrious and entrepreneurial members
of the country. Also the prevalence of Catholic bigotry and the consolidation
of the Inquisition prevented students from attending foreign universities,
impeding any intellectual exchange and rendering scientiﬁc and technologi-
cal innovation improbable.21
It is not necessary to focus on further historical details or to dwell on the
morality of the colonial enterprise as a whole. Suppose colonized states
were not violently deprived of their resources but rather agreed to concede
the use of their territory for some other beneﬁt, say, because the Spanish
promised to build schools in return. The point is that the mere availability
of resources in nature seems irrelevant for determining how much Spain
was able to proﬁt as opposed to other European countries. Failure to adapt
Spanish techniques to the French and Dutch standards of shipbuilding, to
update technological expertise, and to advance scientiﬁc inquiry seem to
have been among the primary causes of the decline in extraction and trade
standards, leading to the decline of the country’s shipping industry. The
nearly exclusive access to gold reserves that Spain enjoyed in the New
World was unable to prevent the economic misery caused by a sinister devel-
opment in its political system and by the obtuse choices of its narrow-minded
leaders. Out of fear for the contagion of heretic thought, Spain was unable to
compete with its neighbors and keep pace with the political and cultural
reforms that were taking place in Europe, thus losing the advantage it initially
had in natural resources. The causes behind the rise and fall of Spain in the
sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and its inability to compete with
other European nation-states seem ascribable to domestic factors: factors
which differ from country to country, including the state’s class structure,
19Earl J. Hamilton, “Imports of American Gold and Silver into Spain, 1503–1660,”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 43, no. 3 (1929): 436–72, 437.
20Earl J. Hamilton, “The Decline of Spain,” The Economic History Review 8, no. 2
(1938): 168–79, 170.
21John H. Elliott, “The Decline of Spain,” Past and Present 20 (Nov., 1961): 52–75.
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its particular legal system, speciﬁc minority policies, its dominant religious
tradition, and so forth.22
Membership in a particular political community need not entitle citizens to
the primary resources that just happen to be territorially available, but the
same does not hold for the product of their use once they are made accessible
through collective human labor.23 Yet it is this and only this latter feature that
seems relevant for distinguishing, of all the resources present in nature that
could potentially produce wealth, those few that are able to do so as a
matter of fact. The claim that “the citizens of a nation which ﬁnds itself on
top of a gold mine do not gain a right to the wealth that might be derived
from it” is true so long as we are clear that “might be” is very different
from “is.” But what “might be derived” from natural resources is also irrele-
vant. Indeed as soon as that abstract possibility becomes a matter of fact,
those contributing to the actual conversion of natural resources into wealth
may, by virtue of their efforts, have a justiﬁed claim to that wealth just as
they may, by virtue of their misdeeds, be considered responsible for its loss.
Notice that I have explicitly left aside the empirical discussion on whether
access to natural resources is, indeed, the most important variable determin-
ing economic growth, all things considered. This question is controversial and
requires much more empirical work to be settled.24 Instead I have tried to
show that even if we grant that natural endowments play a primary role in
inﬂuencing material development, it would be impossible to abstract comple-
tely from community membership in determining how various agents value
accessibility to natural resources, what use they make of it, and consequently
who is entitled to what.
That membership in a particular community is essential to determine how
one uses particular resources does not mean that any cosmopolitan attempt to
search for globally distributive principles is inevitably bound to fail. It only
shows that if cosmopolitans choose to pursue contractarian strategies in jus-
tifying global distributive principles, such strategy should avoid desert-based
claims on political membership.
Of course, one might object here that even if it is impossible to abstract
completely from the input of human labor and collective political responsi-
bility in determining who is entitled to what, we might still consider unjust
22For a different critique of the natural resources argument, see David Miller,
National Responsibility and Global Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 58–
62. I believe, however, that Miller’s claims do not prove the impossibility of justifying
a global, distributive principle but only a speciﬁc way of applying the principle which
seeks to equalize the position of individuals worldwide.
23A referee suggests that one might reach the same conclusion by applying a
Lockean labor theory of value. For reasons of space, I regret not being able to
explore the implications of such suggestion in further detail.
24See the discussions in Dani Rodrik, ed., In Search of Prosperity: Analytical Narratives
on Economic Growth (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
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an uneven allocation of natural resources in the presence of equal amounts
of effort. So, for example, if both Spain and the Netherlands were character-
ized by a very similar political system, very similar social conventions, and
the same population size, but the Netherlands fared worse as a result of their
inability to access natural resources, we might consider it an injustice that
Dutch citizens have to work harder to compensate for not having been
blessed by nature in the distribution of natural resources. This objection
does not, however, challenge the relevance of political communities in deter-
mining entitlements to the product of collective efforts; it merely shows that
political membership is an irrelevant factor in the distribution of initial
endowments. Something may be irrelevant without being morally arbitrary.
But if the defense of political communities is irrelevant (not wrong) for that
initial process of endowment-distribution, so is the cosmopolitan critique
that usually accompanies it.
Where the Arbitrariness-Argument Becomes Unnecessary
This realization leads us to the second, more serious, objection to the
cosmopolitan-contractarian critique of political communities. As I will
attempt to show, not only is such a critique misleading, but it is also unnecess-
ary to the cosmopolitan case for global distributive justice. To understand this
point, it is important to consider how the argument on the arbitrariness of
political communities implicitly modiﬁes the assumptions made in contrac-
tarian circumstances of justice. Recall that according to the contractarian pre-
mises with which we started, all that is required for given circumstances to
qualify as objective circumstances of justice is for them to be characterized
by a conﬂict over scarce resources and by a common interest in solving that
conﬂict. The contractarian perspective on the circumstances of justice is skep-
tical about the roots of this conﬂict and does not attempt to ascribe causal
responsibility to any of the parties involved or examine who was or could
have been justly entitled to possess what, prior to the conﬂict in question.
The contractarian account is silent on how the parties found themselves in
those speciﬁc circumstances of justice, and desert-based considerations are
alien to the deduction of speciﬁc principles of justice.
This point is particularly clear in Rawls’s domestic theory of justice, which,
as it has been pointed out, inspires several cosmopolitan-contractarian recon-
structions of the original position.25 Indeed, as Rawls puts it, “the principles
25The focus on Rawls’s claims is important since the authors we are considering have
no wish to depart from Rawls’s contractarian assumptions in A Theory of Justice while
reconstructing a cosmopolitan original position. Beitz for example emphasizes that “if
one is inclined to reject Rawls’s theory in the domestic case, then the case for a theory of
global justice like the one suggested below is correspondingly weakened” (Political
Theory and International Relations, 129). Thomas Pogge argues that his defense of
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of justice that regulate the basic structure and specify the duties and obli-
gations of individuals do not mention moral desert, and there is no tendency
for distributive shares to correspond to it.”26 What matters is neither how the
conﬂict came about, nor who is entitled to what, but in what way it continues
to affect the parties’ life in common and what kind of consequences it has for
our fundamental social institutions.
This means that the principles that will eventually guide the re-allocation of
scarce resources are not historical principles trying to identify at which point
in time a presumed just process of appropriation was interrupted. They are
instead “end-result principles” according to which the justice of a distribution
is determined by “how things are distributed (who will get what) as judged
by some structural principle(s) of just distribution.”27 In the contractarian
account, the principles determining the distribution of resources are pure pro-
cedural ones resulting from an agreement among parties in the original
position.
How does the cosmopolitan argument on the arbitrariness of political com-
munities implicitly modify the contractarian account of the circumstances of
justice? It does so by introducing an entitlement-based conception of justice
that shifts focus from the social consequences of a speciﬁc allocative
process to its initial starting point. 28 By asserting that membership in a pol-
itical community is arbitrary with regard to what natural resources citizens
deserve, cosmopolitans substitute the need for patterned principles of just
distribution with a query into the historical principles of just acquisition.29
contractarianism “is meant to show that Rawls offers a sound basis for progress in pol-
itical philosophy as well as for political progress” (Realizing Rawls, 1). Simon Caney
also believes that “Rawls’s domestic theory of distributive justice . . . impels us to
apply this theory globally“(Caney, Justice Beyond Borders, 116).
26Rawls,ATheory of Justice, 275. It is only too unfortunate that Rawls himself appears
to have abandoned this important claim in his further discussion of global distribution
in the Law of Peoples, where he introduces desert-based claims in assessing the causes of
national economic development.
27For the distinction between historical and patterned principles of distribution, see
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell 1974), 153–54.
28Cosmopolitans make precisely this movewhen they focus on the “entitlements” of
individuals and inquire on the causes of the wealth of particular societies. Simon
Caney, recalling Brian Barry on this issue, argues that “there is no ground for saying
that the member of the prosperous society can claim to be entitled to more” (Justice
beyond Borders, 112). As I try to show below, he is too quick to make this statement.
There may be such grounds, but if one consistently embraced the kind of contractar-
ianism that cosmopolitans initially claim to embrace, they would not bear the weight
that an entitlement-based perspective assigns them.
29Beitz acknowledges this point when he claims, in response to critics, that his ideas
“would lend support to an argument for some global redistribution to compensate for
the uneven distribution of natural resources or to rectify past injustices” (Beitz, Political
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Yet this process implicitly assumes that the solution to the conﬂict over
resources in given circumstances of justice is the identiﬁcation of the unjust
causes of the initial process of resource allocation. The kind of principles to
which such an analysis leads is contained in the Lockean proviso requiring
that parties leave “enough and as good for others” in the original process
of acquisition. Many cosmopolitans seem to sympathize with this approach.30
Yet they fail to recognize the tension between such principles and the contrac-
tarian premises with which they start. Let us see why.
Suppose we wanted to show the arbitrariness of political communities in
determining entitlements to the wealth produced by natural resources. We
would ﬁrst need to distinguish between human input and raw natural
resources, and while granting that political communities play a role in the
former, we would have to abstract from them with regard to the latter.
We would then presumably identify some kind of historical principle in
order to distribute equally natural resources in accordance with the
Lockean proviso. But it is not clear how this would help to resolve the con-
ﬂict in existent circumstances of justice with which the contractarian account
starts. Even more unclear is how it could justify the selection of “distribu-
tive” principles, requiring a continuous re-allocation of primary goods,
say, in the “difference principle” form. A historical analysis of the circum-
stances of justice would lead, at best, only to rectifying past injustices in
acquisition. Following an entitlement-based conception, once the process
of rectiﬁcation is over, one is free to ignore the further consequences of
speciﬁc interactions, however great the inequalities produced by them.31
The logic underpinning an attempt to identify the historical patterns of
resource acquisition is such that only the original processes of acquisition
and transfer, not their outcome, matter. This rules out the possibility of iden-
tifying end-state principles of distributive justice of the kind made necessary
every time—for whatever reason—the parties ﬁnd themselves in speciﬁc
circumstances of justice.
One could of course argue that cosmopolitan contractarianism may
reconstruct the circumstances of justice in a way that ascribes conﬂict
to an initial injustice in the process of acquisition. Once that conﬂict is
over, cosmopolitan contractarianism might be satisﬁed with whatever
Theory and International Relations, 169). He doesn’t seem to realize that the kind of prin-
ciples one obtains starting from these premises are very different from the ones he
initially tries to justify on contractarian grounds.
30See, for example, Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, 139; Hayward,
“Global Justice and the Distribution of Natural Resources,” 360–61. Pogge explicitly
uses the Lockean argument in justifying a global resource dividend in his “An
Egalitarian Law of Peoples,” 200–201.
31See the justiﬁcation of this point in Nozick, Anarchy, State, Utopia, 162-63.
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inequalities arise as a result of successive interactions and ignore the need
for further distributions of primary goods. Yet this statement would be
incompatible with the cosmopolitan commitment to distributive equality
as an end in itself: the idea that everyone is entitled to equal standards of
well-being that constitutes the moral core of the theory. Equality in an
entitlement-based conception of justice constitutes merely a starting point,
not a goal to realize each time a distributive conﬂict threatens the stability
of society. However, it is precisely this conﬂict, whatever its origin and
the material deprivation to which it leads, that seems to preoccupy cosmo-
politan contractarians at the global level.
In summary, arguing that political membership is arbitrary in determining
an individual’s entitlement to a portion of the earth’s natural resources is irre-
levant for resolving conﬂicting claims in contractarian circumstances of
justice. Showing that the citizens of particular political communities do not
deserve the wealth they have acquired is difﬁcult, but it is also unimportant.
For even if those individuals or communities did deserve that wealth (as they
indeedmay), wewould, true to our contractarian premises, assess the circum-
stances of justice from the point of view of their consequences on fundamental
global interactions, not from the point of view of how it came about. And here
the argument on the arbitrariness of political communities would become
superﬂuous. Indeed, even accepting that political communities are not arbi-
trary in determining entitlements, one might argue that relevant international
circumstances of justice override desert-based claims of both communities
and individuals and require us to rethink the principles promoting global
equality.
Consider the case of migration or the pressure of environmental threats.
These are only two examples of globally pervasive conﬂicts: they affect
every political community in the world, and everyone has good reason to
seek principles that resolve the tensions they produce. But it is not clear
how desert-based considerations on the arbitrariness of political communities
help us to identify the principles needed. For example, even if companies had
a legitimate claim to the wealth derived from their activity, we would not
think it inappropriate to tax them for the sake of a cleaner environment,
given the potential impact of environmental disaster on everyone’s life. Or
even if some countries had deserved some additional wealth drawn from
the use of natural resources, we would not think it inappropriate to require
they sacriﬁce part of such wealth to accommodate the claims of refugees
ﬂeeing from starvation or genocide. But the principles drawn from desert-
based considerations, grounded on the arbitrariness of political communities,
give us no normative tools for dealing with such issues.
For standard contractarians, valid principles of justice in given conﬂictual
circumstances—no matter how they arise—are those that no one could
reasonably reject. But it is not clear how the argument on the arbitrariness
of political communities contributes to their identiﬁcation. Only the impact
of a particular conﬂict in given circumstances of justice and the reasons
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agents might have to solve it must be taken into account while reconstructing
the contractarian perspective on global justice.32 Anything existent cosmopo-
litan accounts add to this loads the argument with unnecessary claims
turning contractarianism into a weak, justiﬁcatory strategy.
The Nature of the Parties
Having illustrated some weaknesses in the cosmopolitan reconstruction of
the contractarian account from the point of view of the circumstances of
justice, I now examine its critique of political communities by analyzing the
nature of the parties involved in the original choice situation. The previous
section emphasized how the cosmopolitan account of the circumstances of
justice modiﬁes the contractarian premises in a way that, even if justiﬁed,
would lead to a different set of principles from the ones originally required.
This section tries to show how abstracting from political membership and
relying on a cosmopolitan account of the original position is unwarranted
and renders those principles unnecessary.
First, the section argues that the cosmopolitan reconstruction of the original
position modiﬁes and ultimately weakens the contractarian account of the
subjective circumstances of justice. Second, it emphasizes that even if one
accepts it hypothetically, the degree to which it moralizes the parties is so con-
siderable that it becomes difﬁcult to understand why principles of justice are
needed in the ﬁrst place. Finally, it suggests that a cosmopolitan-contractarian
need not ground his case in favor of global distributive justice on dubious
assumptions about the arbitrariness of particular political communities.
One can instead start with an idea of agents embedded in particular social
and political relations and consider political membership an important
factor for establishing principles of distributive equality.
Where the Arbitrariness-Argument Goes Wrong
Let us ﬁrst clarify the nature of the subjects in cosmopolitan circumstances of
justice. Without rejecting Rawls’s domestic account on the circumstances of
justice, Pogge starts with an idea of the global original position in which the
32For a further discussion of how one could justify global distributive principles, start-
ing from circumstances of justice that do not need to abstract from the parties’ political
membership, see my “Sufﬁciency, Equality and Power: A Statist Defense of Global
Egalitarianism” (Paper presented at the Social and Political Theory Seminar, Research
School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, December 2007). For alterna-
tive interpretations that only justify principles of assistance to burdened societies, see
David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice, 163–200. Thomas Nagel, “The
Problem of Global Justice,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 33, no. 2 (2005): 113–47 and
John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 106–118.
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“parties are representatives of persons, never of associations or states.”33 Other
cosmopolitans pursue this argument further. According to David Richards,
since “one’s membership in one nation as opposed to another and the
natural inequality among nations may be as morally fortuitous as any other
natural fact,” all individuals are entitled to be included in the global original
position as such.34 For Charles Beitz, “if the original position is to represent
individuals as equal moral persons for the purpose of choosing principles of
institutional or background justice, then the criterion of membership is posses-
sion of the two essential powers of moral personality.”35
The cosmopolitan original position, although claiming to start with a
roughly analogous account to the domestic circumstances of justice, modiﬁes
its assumptions with regard to the nature of the parties in a way that makes it
impossible to deliver the required principles of distributive justice. In stan-
dard contractarian accounts, Rawls’s domestic contractarian theory of
justice relates to Hume’s account of society where parties are engaged in con-
ﬂict, as well as agreement, of interests. Cooperative interactions are due to the
interdependence of needs and interests, rough equality of power, and the
limited natural and intellectual abilities of the parties. As Hume puts it:
“By the conjunction of forces our power is augmented: By the partition of
employments our ability encreases [sic]: By mutual succour we are less
expos’d to the fortune of accidents.”36 The need for principles of justice
arises when equally motivated parties are willing to work together to
resolve conﬂicting claims and to identify institutions that distribute fairly
societal beneﬁts and burdens.37
But how does the cosmopolitan original position reframe the subjective cir-
cumstances of justice? And what role does its critique of political commu-
nities play at this point of the argument? The ﬁrst relevant difference
concerns the presupposition of the rough equality of individuals in the
global original position. While we can, indeed, assume that within particular
political communities human beings are more or less equal in power due to
their development in similar cultural circumstances and to their joint involve-
ment in framing collective social institutions, it is obviously not so if we
33Pogge, Realizing Rawls, 247.
34See Richards, A Theory of Reasons for Action, 290.
35Beitz, “Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiments,” 595.
36David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, [1739]
1985), 486. Rawls in A Theory of Justice underlines how his own account of the subjec-
tive circumstances of justice “adds nothing essential” to Hume’s “much fuller discus-
sion.” As already emphasized, the contractarian cosmopolitans we are considering are
also keen to emphasize that their account of the original position is simply an exten-
sion of Rawls’s domestic contractarian account. For this reason, I assume that the rel-
evance of circumstances of justice in constructing a contractarian-type of argument in
favor of global distributive justice remains the same.
37Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 109.
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consider how very different social environments, standards of education, and
cultural backgrounds shape different life expectations. The construction of a
global original position cannot ignore how particular social, political, and lin-
guistic boundaries might exert a deep impact on the claims people make on
each other and on the strategies chosen to pursue speciﬁc ends. Those differ-
ences in cultural, educational, or religious backgrounds are so relevant that
they might ultimately affect the very possibility of identifying a common
set of primary goods subject to distributive requirements.
Consider the following example that cosmopolitan contractarians often
suggest to show the relevance of global circumstances of justice where the
parties coincide with individuals and political membership is deemed to be
irrelevant. Suppose we start with a global original position where, for
example, individuals from Papua, New Guinea, and individuals from
Sweden are represented. It would be difﬁcult to see how membership in
each could be considered an arbitrary feature and how cultural, linguistic,
and educational backgrounds would not affect the bargaining capacity of
such individuals. It is absurd to assume that the citizens of Papua have
roughly equal needs and interests to the citizens of Sweden and to conclude
from this that they would also converge on the primary goods to be distrib-
uted worldwide. At least in the present stage of human development, the
needs and interests contributing to make certain social goods desirable do
not arise merely in response to natural motives but are mediated by cultural
and historical factors, the organization of labor, standards of education, and
so on. As the collective social and political environment that shapes the char-
acter of individuals as well as their social preferences, political communities
cannot simply be ignored. Reducing membership to an arbitrary feature or
pretending that one can abstract from it without affecting the way in which
the parties will interact to choose speciﬁc distributive principles turns con-
tractarianism into a much weaker justiﬁcatory strategy.
Of course such cultural and educational differences between individuals
matter even in domestic circumstances of justice. However, sharing a public
political culture and being aware of the general facts of social cooperation
that inﬂuence an individual’s position within domestic institutional structures
mean that the chances of converging on a set of primary goods are much
greater in domestic circumstances. I will return to this point when discussing
the “veil of ignorance” and its relation to political membership. Here it is
important to be clear that the argument I have put forward does not
oppose the idea of an original position but only those defenses of it that
ignore political membership.
But consider the following objection. A critic might say that if the parties in
the original position did not know towhich country they belonged, if they did
not know whether the subjects in circumstances of justice were Papuans or
Swedes, for example, they would converge on global principles of justice
satisfying Papuan and Swedish people alike. Such principles would reform
the world-political institutions in a way that provided individuals with
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equivalent opportunities worldwide, thus designing a system of international
cooperation that beneﬁts all of them, regardless of the country of their origin.
But if we accept this suggestion, we encounter the well-known difﬁculty of
identifying what exactly equal principles of justice consist of.
This problem may be summarized as the “metric problem.”38 The metric
problem emphasizes the difﬁculty, culturally and politically, of identifying a
unique measurement or metric of distribution that equally suits every indi-
vidual in the same way. The issue at stake here is not merely an empirical dif-
ﬁculty but also, as often emphasized, the difﬁculty of determining what
“equality of opportunity means in a culturally plural world in which different
societies will construct goods in different ways and also rank them in different
ways.” As one author points out, “we can onlymake judgments with any con-
ﬁdence in extreme cases, and in those cases, what seems at ﬁrst sight to be a
concern about inequality may well turn out on closer inspection to be a
concern with absolute poverty or deprivation, a concern which suggests a
quite different understanding of global justice.”39 Thus, the difﬁculty of intro-
ducing the arbitrariness claim on political membership in contractarian
defenses of global justice is that it leads to an unwarranted defense of individ-
ual equality of opportunity.
Where the Arbitrariness-Argument Becomes Unnecessary
The cosmopolitan critique of political communities is not only problematic
but also unnecessary for a contractarian case in favor of global justice. In
order to understand this issue, it is necessary to examine in further
depth how the moral constraints cosmopolitans put on the parties in the
global original position inadvertently depart from domestic contractarian
assumptions. While embracing a Humean account of the subjective circum-
stances of justice, Rawls emphasizes two human features that create a
special necessity for justice: individual selﬁshness and moderate generosity.
He then goes on to argue that this presumption ensures that “the principles
of justice do not depend upon strong assumptions.” Indeed, “the original
38This objection to the cosmopolitan argument on the arbitrariness of political com-
munities has already beenmade by DavidMiller, so I will not reassess it at great length
here. See his National Responsibility and Global Justice, 62–68.
39Ibid., 68. Miller is wrong to think that because it is difﬁcult to identify a metric for
equalizing opportunities between individuals, this defeats any alternative cosmopoli-
tan argument for global distributive principles. What he fails to realize is that the
issue of who is affected by speciﬁc distributive principles may be separated from
the issue of whether there are global distributive principles at all. Indeed it is possible
to solve the metric problem by simply substituting equal opportunity for individuals
with equal opportunities for states. I have explored this issue in my “Equality,
Sufﬁciency and Power: A Statist Defense of Global Egalitarianism.”.
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position is meant to incorporate widely shared and yet weak conditions.”40
Justice then constitutes the outcome of a shared agreement on common inter-
ests; it is the virtue of practices where “there are competing interests and
where persons feel entitled to press their rights on each other.”41 As Hume
reminds us, “[E]ncrease to a sufﬁcient degree the benevolence of men, or
the bounty of nature, and you render justice useless, by supplying its place
with much nobler virtues, and more valuable blessings.”42 Were moral feel-
ings reliable enough in every human being, justice would become
superﬂuous.
The cosmopolitan original position inadvertently modiﬁes this account of
the nature of the parties. The model of international association proposed
in this case is based not upon “free bargaining” but upon “some values
that are genuinely shared.”43 In the cosmopolitan account, the subjects of
the original position are to be viewed as “moral persons” who assess the
rationality of global distributive principles “with reference to a baseline of
equality.”44 Clearly, the subjects involved in this choice situation are quite
different from those interacting in Humean circumstances of justice. While
in Hume’s and, more ambiguously, Rawls’s case the parties of the original
position are strategic and selﬁsh human beings interested in maximizing
their interests, in the cosmopolitan one they represent moral subjects, com-
mitted to some basic principles of equality and justice.
The difﬁculty with such an account is that by moralizing the subjects of the
original position, cosmopolitanism relies precisely on that for which justice is
required. Indeed, what differentiates the global original position from the
domestic contractarian one is that for the latter, the social contract does
not constitute the outcome of moral agreement on a speciﬁc conception of
justice but of the overlapping convergence of mutually disinterested parties.
Rawls’s contractarianism here echoes Rousseau’s question on whether there
can be “a legitimate and reliable rule of administration in the civil order
taking men as they are and laws as they can be.” As Rousseau puts it in the
beginning of The Social Contract, “I shall try always to reconcile in this research
what right permits with what interest prescribes so that justice and utility are
not at variance.”45
Far from starting with parties which naturally possess a sense of justice,
this type of contractarianism justiﬁes the necessity of external authority pre-
cisely in the case of the absence of agreement on general moral principles.
40Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 111.
41Ibid., 113.
42Ibid., 494.
43Pogge, Realizing Rawls, 227.
44Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, 203.
45Jean Jacques Rousseau, “Of the Social Contract,” in The Social Contract and Other
Later Political Writings, ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, [1772] 1997), 40.
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Rather than creating ex nihilo a particular political union, one needs to
presuppose it. Normative theory starts with a given set of political insti-
tutions—as in Rawls’s well-ordered society—and enquires on the principles
needed for their reform. Rousseau also makes this point very clear while dis-
cussing the necessity of a legislator: “[I]n order for an emerging people to
appreciate the healthy maxims of politics. . . the effect would have to
become the cause; the social spirit, which should be the result of the insti-
tution, would have to preside over the founding of the institution itself,
and men would have to be prior to laws what they ought to become by
means of laws.”46
Hence, one cannot expect natural moral duties to ground political agree-
ments, since it is precisely because of their unreliability that justice is required.
Kant also insists on the issue while discussing the role of political legislation
in promoting human moral progress. Indeed, as he puts it, “we cannot expect
the moral attitudes of people to produce a good political constitution; on the
contrary, it is only through the latter that they can be expected to attain a good
level of moral culture.” In fact, Kant adds, by relying on morality alone
“nothing will be achieved.”47
This understanding of moral capacity not as an original property shared by
all individuals but rather as a disposition of humanity that needs to be histori-
cally developed marks an important, though little noticed, difference with the
contemporary cosmopolitan account.48 Far from raising obstacles to the emer-
gence of moral personality, as in the cosmopolitan theories we are examining,
membership in a political community contributes to its full emancipation. As
Kant claims in his early essay on universal history, it is only by entering into a
civil constitution that “all the germs of humanity could be unfolded.”49 This
also explains why, in Kant’s theory of international relations, the conﬂict
among different political communities cannot be considered quite analogous
to the condition of individuals in an anarchical state of nature. Indeed states,
unlike individuals, “already have a lawful internal constitution,” and a
republic is “by its very nature disposed to perpetual peace.”50 The public rec-
ognition of a collective authority that limits and constrains individuals’ claims
constitutes the ﬁrst step toward a process of human emancipation by virtue of
46Ibid., 80 ff.
47Immanuel Kant, Toward Perpetual Peace: “A Philosophical Sketch,” in Political
Writings, trans. H.B. Nisbet, ed. Hans Reiss (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1991), 109.
48For an excellent analysis of the difference, emphasizing the metaphysical require-
ments of Kant’s Doctrine of Right, see Katrin Flikschuh, Kant and Modern Political
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 185–89.
49Kant, Idea for Universal History, in Immanuel Kant, Political Writings, proposition
VII.
50Kant, Toward Perpetual Peace.
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which political subjects agree to obey the laws that they have given to
themselves.51
If in this standard contractarian account of justice individuals in the state of
nature are considered to be strategic maximizers and political communities
provide the most relevant associative context in which humanity’s potential
moral powers are fully realized, the opposite occurs in the cosmopolitan
account. The two relevant starting points for a cosmopolitan interpretation
of the original position are the concept of individuals considered as “free
and equal moral persons” and a bargaining situation from which all
“morally arbitrary” factors should be excluded.52 The parties in circum-
stances of justice are individual moral units whose natural inclination to
justice leads them to favor speciﬁc global distributive principles.53 This
issue is controversial: if we were to rely on individuals’ altruism and ability
to comply spontaneously with speciﬁc moral laws, one would have difﬁculty
understanding the emergence of conﬂict and explain how claims of justice
could arise.
One response might be that justice is required for reasons of coordination
in order to support the parties’ distribution of beneﬁts and burdens and
prevent unjust, unintended consequences of social interactions. But if this
were indeed the case, what is gained by declaring political communities
arbitrary from a moral perspective? If anything, they might contribute to a
partial resolution of the coordination dispute by making available a set of
institutional mechanisms through which the claims of members (at least)
are accommodated. This thought animates Kant’s account of international
justice where far from being considered arbitrary entities, collective political
agents who have internally realized public right subject themselves to exter-
nal non-coercive agreements serving a common interest in peaceful and just
intercommunity relations.54
Cosmopolitans need not prove political communities arbitrary in order to
build a convincing case for international circumstances of justice. Showing
that a conﬂict between subjects may give rise to speciﬁc claims of justice is
possible even starting from standard contractarian premises that recognize
the relevance of political membership. Following Rousseau and Kant, one
might argue that existing tensions among states and a global conﬂict
over the distribution of scarce resources threaten the stability of the
51Ibid., 104. For a more detailed exploration of this issue, see my “Sovereignty,
Cosmopolitanism and the Ethics of European Foreign Policy,” European Journal of
Political Theory, no. 7 (2008): 349-64.
52Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, 203; Moellendorf, Cosmopolitan
Justice, 32–33, 37–38; Caney, Justice Beyond Borders, 115.
53How the individual moral sense of justice arises is a separate issue that I assess in
the following section.
54See Kant, Toward Perpetual Peace, 114.
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international system and affect the life-prospects of citizens in each political
community.55
On this view the state could be considered a cultivating ground for cosmopo-
litan morality. Taking part in collective processes of decision-making already
limits the arbitrary wants of individuals, teaches them to live in common, and
educates them to a sense of the collective. Once individuals have learned to
live in a political association, it is easier for them to see the advantages of collec-
tive deliberation and consider the interactions between them and outsiders from
a less narrow-minded perspective. International anarchy would be just as unat-
tractive as the anarchy of the state of nature, and having enjoyed the beneﬁts of
abandoning the latter, they might be more motivated to exit from the former.
The advantage of such a view is that it need not start from dubious assump-
tions about the degree of moral awareness individuals must already possess.
It is sufﬁcient to argue that the members of the international society have
reasons to want to avoid the potential harms of a perpetual condition of inter-
national anarchy and may jointly contribute to the establishment of a collec-
tive and cooperative institutional regime.56 Of course one might retort here
that considering political membership in this light is as implausible as the
assumption of moralized parties we are trying to challenge. Some impli-
cations of this idea are considered more in detail in the following section.
The Veil of Ignorance and the Sense of Justice
To justify the assumption of moralized parties and the shift away from the
postulates of mutual disinterest and limited generosity, cosmopolitans
might underline the “hypothetical” character of the social contract. Such an
interpretation would be in line with an interpretation of the original position
as an “idea of reason” that allows us to think of the choice situation in ways
“similar to the point of view from which noumenal selves see the world.”57
The idea is operationalized in A Theory of Justice through the device of the
“veil of ignorance.” This section examines the demands of the veil of ignor-
ance in the global original position and illustrates some of its shortcomings
in bracketing political membership and generating support for a cosmopoli-
tan conception of distributive justice.
55See for example Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Abstract and Judgement of Saint Pierre’s
Project of Perpetual Peace,” in Rousseau on International Relations, ed. S. Hoffman and
D. Fidler (Oxford: Clarendon Press, [1756] 1991) and Kant, Toward Perpetual Peace, 104.
For a more detailed historical reconstruction of Rousseau’s and Kant’s analysis of the
circumstances of international justice, see my “Sovereignty, Cosmopolitanism and the
Ethics of European Foreign Policy.”
56The English School analysis of international society relies precisely on these
assumptions; see, for one example, Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of
Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977).
57Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 225.
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In A Theory of Justice, Rawls clariﬁes that the idea of a veil of ignorance is
introduced in order to eliminate the effects of speciﬁc contingencies that
would tempt people to exploit the choice situation to their own advantage.
Thus “the veil of ignorance deprives the persons in the original position
of the knowledge that would enable them to choose heteronomous
principles.”58 The parties in the original position are unaware of their class
and social status, or do not know their particular natural talents or social
skills; they ignore their life-plans as well as their psychological disposition to
speciﬁc opportunities.59 The informational restrictions introduced by the veil
of ignorance aim to guarantee fair bargaining conditions, which should lead
to principles of justice that could subsequently themselves be considered fair.
Where the Arbitrariness-Argument Goes Wrong
Cosmopolitans suggest that in the global original position, the veil of ignor-
ance should also be extended to the parties’ knowledge of the particular com-
munity to which they belong. Beitz has argued that “the parties to the original
position cannot be assumed to know that they are members of a particular
national society.. . . The veil of ignorance must extend to all matters of national
citizenship, and the principles chosen will therefore apply globally.”60 Pogge
has also emphasized how “nationality is just one further deep contingency
(like genetic endowment, race, gender, and social class), one more potential
basis for inequalities that are inescapable and present from birth.” If one
takes seriously the idea of abstracting from all contingent features for the
sake of a fair bargaining situation, he claims, “there is no reason to treat
this case differently from the others.”61
This argument has been criticized for making it difﬁcult to assess which
institutions fall under considerations of justice and which ones could be
taken for granted.62 It is emphasized, for example, that, if followed rigorously,
the cosmopolitan thought experiment might challenge every institution
through which individuals organize collectively, not only political commu-
nities but also international organizations, civil associations, the market
sphere, and even the family. An indiscriminate extension of the veil of ignor-
ance in the global sphere appears to raise the question of the amount of infor-
mation that the parties would choose to maintain or reject. If the idea of the
veil of ignorance were pursued to its logical conclusion, the parties would
not only ignore their citizenship but also the generation to which they
58Ibid., 222.
59Ibid., 118.
60Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, 151.
61Pogge, Realizing Rawls, 247.
62See, for example, Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2006), 264–72.
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belong, the economic and political conditions of the international sphere,
humanity’s level of civilization, and so on. Martha Nussbaum underlines
this point by claiming that “if you do not know that a multinational
cooperation exists, you will probably not imagine one as part of an ideal
structure of global justice.. . . [I]f you do not know about the Internet, it will
not be easy to imagine it; but then you will not be able to address the inequal-
ities created by differential access to it.”63
This critique seems to neglect one important feature of the veil of ignorance
and risks being misleading. While the thought experiment requires individ-
uals to abstract from contingent personal features in positioning themselves
in the original choice situation, it does not exclude the knowledge of
general facts about society as well as of the basic principles of political organ-
ization. One of the most relevant elements characterizing the parties behind
the veil of ignorance is that they are assumed to know as little as possible
when it comes to speciﬁc individuals preferences, talents or social status,
and as much as possible on the general rules of the system of cooperation
to which their conception of justice applies. As Rawls clariﬁes, “there are
no limitations on general laws and theories, since conceptions of justice
must be adjusted to general systems of social cooperation which they are to
regulate, and there is no reason to rule out these facts.”64
The real question raised by the cosmopolitan extension of the veil of ignor-
ance is thenwhether the parties’ political membership is the kind of knowledge
that one can afford to ignore without weakening the justiﬁcation of global dis-
tributive principles. Here there are two possibilities to consider. In one version
of the cosmopolitan argument, we might imagine individuals abstracting from
the existence of any form of collective association and deliberating, in general,
whether a global distribution of beneﬁts and burdens should follow territorial
lines with a designated authority holding monopoly over the use of force. The
parties in the original position, that is, would ignore the existence of states and
reﬂect on whether some kind of state-like form of organization would be
appropriate in reforming the basic structure of society. 65
This argument appears particularly weak. Rawls’s conception of domestic
justice applies to society understood as a well-established system of practice
and is grounded on assumptions considered to be widely shared. From this
perspective, ruling out some kind of general knowledge about the existence
of a world divided into bounded political communities seems inappropriate.
63Ibid., 266.
64Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 119.
65This would be the interpretation more in line with Beitz’s statement that “it is not
the case that we begin with an actually existing basic structure and ask whether it is
reasonable for individuals to cooperate in it. Rather, we begin with the idea that
some type of basic structure is both required and inevitable . . . andwork towards prin-
ciples the structure should satisfy” (Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations,
203). For an analogous statement, see also Pogge, Realizing Rawls, 139–41.
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Indeed, in the domestic case, the parties do not question the existence of
certain institutional arrangements such as the constitution, courts of justice,
or the presence of market interactions—these are all taken for granted as
part of society’s basic structure. Rather, the burden of decision relies on
“what kind of constitution,” “what kind of courts,” and “what kind of
market” are required to accommodate the claims of justice. Analogously, in
the international sphere the question is not about arguing whether political
communities ought to exist at all but rather how the distribution of beneﬁts
and burdens among a given plurality of them could be conceived.
This leads to the second possibility that the veil of ignorance might intro-
duce regarding the parties’ information on their political membership. One
might imagine that although knowing about the existence of particular politi-
cal communities and their characteristics, the subjects of a global original pos-
ition are deprived of knowing how they relate to each other. For example,
each subject in the original position might be aware that China, Zimbabwe,
and the United States are part of the world’s political map, and they might
also have access to the general social facts relevant to those countries, yet
simply ignore whether (s)he is Chinese, Zimbabwean, or American. According
to this second cosmopolitan interpretation, the only relevant feature to take
into account while evaluating claims of justice in the global original position
would be whether all parties have “a capacity for an effective sense of justice
and a capacity to form, revise, and pursue a conception of the good”.66
The appeal to the parties “effective sense of justice” is, indeed, crucial to
building a persuasive contractarian case in favor of speciﬁc distributive prin-
ciples. In Rawls’s domestic theory, the sense of justice motivates the parties to
act by the principles chosen in the original position, thus illustrating how
justice as fairness emerges as the most stable conception. As Rawls puts it,
“a system in which each person has, and is known by everyone to have, a
sense of justice is inherently stable. Other things being equal, the forces
making for its stability increase as time passes.”67
66See Beitz, “Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiments,” 595, 593, 596; see also
Richards, A Theory of Reasons for Action, 278–82, 289–93, and Brian Barry,
“International Society from a Cosmopolitan Perspective,” in International Society:
Diverse Ethical Perspectives, ed. David Mapel and Terry Nardin (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1998), 144–63.
67John Rawls, “The Sense of Justice,” The Philosophical Review 72, no. 3 (1963): 293.
The question of stability is at the heart of the third part of A Theory of Justice and
was considered by Rawls one of the main issues motivating the reassessment of his
ﬁrst major work in Political Liberalism. In the latter, the problem of moral motivation
is linked very clearly to the public culture of a particular political association:
“[G]iven certain assumptions, specifying a reasonable human psychology and the
normal conditions of human life, those who grow up under just basic institutions
acquire a sense of justice and a reasoned allegiance to those institutions sufﬁcient to
render them stable. Expressed another way, citizens’ sense of justice, given their
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This emphasis on “time” as a crucial feature for understanding how the
sense of justice may develop and strengthen among the subjects of the orig-
inal position is linked to the moral psychology thatATheory of Justice, inspired
by Rousseau’s Emile, provides. The appeal to the moral force of the “purely
conscientious act,” “the desire to do what is right and just simply because
it is right and just,” is clearly not enough.68 Rousseau was among the ﬁrst
to raise the question of moral motivation in the acceptance of contractarian
principles when he claimed that “it is not by sumptuary laws that luxury
can be successfully extirpated; it is from the depth of the heart itself that
you must uproot it by impressing men with healthier and nobler tastes.”69
For Rawls, as for Rousseau, the willingness to act not merely due to coercion
but spontaneously according to the principles of justice is not independent of
practices of cooperation in a particular society. It is linked to speciﬁc processes
of psychological and political emancipation, to the way in which individuals
come to form their beliefs, rely upon speciﬁc intuitions or discard others, and
develop feelings of mutual trust and solidarity. In order for justice as fairness
to emerge as the most stable conception in a contractarian procedure of jus-
tiﬁcation, the parties’ sense of justice must reﬂect the public norms of political
communication as rooted in the institutional development of a particular
society. Indeed, “what justiﬁes a conception of justice is not its being true to
an order antecedent to and given to us, but its congruence with our deeper
understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, and our realization that
given our history and the traditions embedded in our public life, it is the
most reasonable doctrine for us.”70
Where the Arbitrariness-Argument Becomes Unnecessary
It is easy to see how the cosmopolitan construction of a global original pos-
ition modiﬁes the classic contractarian assumptions on the parties’ sense of
justice so as to unnecessarily weaken the method’s justiﬁcatory potential.
traits of character and interests as formed by living under a just basic structure, is
strong enough to resist the normal tendencies to injustice. Citizens act willingly so
as to give one another justice over time. Stability is secured by sufﬁcient motivation
of the appropriate kind acquired under just institution.” See John Rawls, Political
Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 142. For a more critical
appraisal of this question and of the transition from A Theory of Justice to Political
Liberalism, see Brian Barry, “Rawls and the Search for Stability,” Ethics 105, no. 4
(1995): 874–915.
68Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 454.
69Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Considerations on the Government of Poland,” in The
Social Contract and Other Later Political Writings, 177–260.
70John Rawls, “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory,” The Journal of Philosophy
77, no. 9 (1980): 515–72, 519.
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The cosmopolitan extension of the veil of ignorance requires precisely that the
history, traditions, and civic life shaping the social expectations and motiv-
ation of different subjects are considered arbitrary features and assumes
that they play no role in the parties’ forming an “effective sense of justice.”
While imprudently ignoring the criterion of stability in the justiﬁcation of
global distributive principles and ambiguously returning to the doctrine of
the “purely conscientious act,” the cosmopolitan-contractarian reconstruction
of the global original position encounters an even greater obstacle. It places
behind the veil of ignorance features that might be crucial for understanding
the basis for public agreement and conceals important intuitions that one
needs to take into account in weighting alternative views on global justice.
Ultimately, it fails to examine the background assumptions that might lead
to a widely acceptable account of distributive justice.
By bracketing the parties’ attachment to a particular set of collective politi-
cal institutions, the cosmopolitan reconstruction of the global original pos-
ition is left with a rather obscure view on the parties “effective sense of
justice” and an extremely weak analysis of what might motivate them to
act in accordance with speciﬁc principles. Except for a few moral heroes, an
“effective sense of justice” does not arise exclusively out of the subjects’
attachment to purely moral motives but may be socially and politically con-
structed as well as speciﬁc to each form of collective political association.
To claim that an innate, universal “sense of justice” understood as an uncon-
ditional compliance with rationally justiﬁed principles might be very rare,
and that one needs to take into account the way particular societies inform
their members’ desire for justice, is not to rule out that it might be possible
to justify distributive principles on a global scale, all things considered.
What it emphasizes is that extending the veil of ignorance on issues of politi-
cal membership might not be the most appropriate kind of informational
restriction to introduce in the global original position. The sort of knowledge
that one would be brought to ignore in this case might affect what remains of
the parties’ sense of justice, thus turning the contractarian account into a very
weak justiﬁcatory device.
One might, of course, object here that the sense of justice amounts to
nothing more than the motivation to comply with living under just insti-
tutions. If this were indeed so, the veil of ignorance would not conceal any
important information: one may emphasize that people behind the veil
have a minimal motivation to comply so that whatever sense of justice we
assume domestically we can count on internationally too. In a way, it is unde-
niable that, with regard to some issues at least, people’s sense of justice over-
laps worldwide, regardless of political membership. Perhaps one does not
need to know where he or she comes from to consider torturing babies
wrong and the sense of justice on this particular question would be strong
enough to support institutions prohibiting such a practice. Whether this
kind of thin, reactive, motivation is also enough to support the more demand-
ing global institutional reforms required by cosmopolitan distributive justice
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is a different matter. Domestically, at least, the sense of justice is not due
merely to people’s abstract respect for a public system of rules but is comple-
mented by other psychological pro-attitudes developed in the process of
growing up in a particular political community, of sharing the values of a
public culture, of maturing particular attachments to a set of people, speaking
the same language, knowing a particular history. But cosmopolitan-
contractarians need not consider these features arbitrary or detrimental to
their own cause; they may instead approach global political reform by
virtue of an internal transformation of political communities compatible
with cosmopolitan goals.71 The veil of ignorance on issues of political mem-
bership does nothing to consolidate people’s motivation to comply with cos-
mopolitan principles. It merely succeeds in weakening the sense of justice that
they might already have, thus rendering global distributive justice even more
difﬁcult to support.
Conclusion
Assessing contractarian strategies for justifying global distributive principles,
with a particular emphasis on the cosmopolitan critique of political member-
ship, I have thus rejected the claim that political membership is arbitrary for
global justice. Focusing on the circumstances of justice, the nature of the
parties, and the use and function of the veil of ignorance, I have argued
that the cosmopolitan attempt to abstract from political membership in justi-
fying global distributive principles is both unwarranted and unnecessary.
With regard to the ﬁrst issue—the circumstances of justice—the cosmopolitan
analysis of the role of political communities unnecessarily introduces desert-
based claims that, even if justiﬁed, would lead to historical principles for the
rectiﬁcation of past justice and not to the distributive ones originally required.
With regard to the second issue (the nature of the parties), the cosmopolitan
attempt to bracket political membership thoroughly modiﬁes some relevant
contractarian premises and moralizes the subjects of the original position to
the point of abolishing all instances of conﬂict and rendering justice unnecess-
ary. In the third case, I illustrated how the demand to extend the veil of ignor-
ance to issues of political membership limits the parties’ sense of justice,
negatively affects the quest for stability, and fails to indicate what widely
shared intuitions might provide a common ground for public deliberation
among parties at the global level. Rejecting the normative standing of political
communities does not reinforce the case for global distributive principles; it
succeeds only in turning contractarianism into a very weak justiﬁcatory
strategy.
71I explore this issue in my “Statist Cosmopolitanism,” Journal of Political Philosophy
16, no. 1 (2008): 48–71.
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Existing defenses of the normative standing of political communities are
usually combined with a critique of all cosmopolitan arguments in favor of
global distributive justice.72 This article has separated the two questions,
and while forcefully rejecting several cosmopolitan arguments concerning
the arbitrariness of political communities, it has remained agnostic about
the possibility of justifying global distributive principles once we admit the
role of political communities. Elsewhere I have argued that the defense of
the normative standing of political communities is compatible with and
necessary for cosmopolitan justice.73 The main aim here has been critical
and interpretative. If one takes seriously the need to integrate the moral
core of cosmopolitanism with principles regulating the global distribution
of beneﬁts and burdens, efforts made to deny the relevance of political mem-
bership may be liable to undo the argument.
72For a ﬁrst reference see Rawls, The Law of Peoples, and for endorsements of Rawls’s
claim, David A. Reidy, “Rawls on International Justice, A Defense.” Political Theory 32,
no. 3 (2004): 291–319; Aaron James, “Constructing Justice for Existing Practice: Rawls
and the Status Quo,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 33, no. 3 (2005): 281–316; Samuel
Freeman, “The Law of Peoples, Social Cooperation, Human Rights, and Distributive
Justice,” Social Philosophy and Policy 23, no. 1 (2006): 29–68; David Heyd, “Justice
and Solidarity: The Contractarian Case against Global Justice,” Journal of Social
Philosophy 38, no. 1 (2007): 112–30.
73See my “Statist Cosmopolitanism.”
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